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ABSTRACT
Natural resources have been defined by the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic,
Polisario Front, and a number of non-governmental organisations not only as
an essential part of the Western Sahara conflict, but also as a battlefield that
has attracted the interest of the international community. This article
explores how the ethical trade guidelines of two large institutional investors
– the Norwegian and Swedish pension funds – have affected the behaviour
of companies that export and exploit the natural resources of Western
Sahara. The results of applying a triad-network model suggest that as
pension funds have more instruments of influence, their strategy becomes
more effective. Moreover, investments that follow ethical trade guidelines
play a key role in pressuring companies to modify objectionable behaviours.
KEYWORDS Western Sahara; pension funds; natural resources; international law; ethical business
Introduction
The dispute over the status of Western Sahara is one of Africa’s longest
running conflicts.
The discourse of the Sahrawis, the inhabitants of what is known as the last
colony in Africa, has evolved over the course of their battle to achieve a long-
desired independence.
Although Sahrawi demands initially concentrated on questions related to
economics and human rights, they later focused directly on the idea of inde-
pendence. Currently, the management and exploitation of natural resources
is a central part of the Sahrawi discourse, which is aimed at keeping their
demands on the international political agenda (Allan 2016).
Academics and the international community have paid increasing atten-
tion to the role of natural resources in the continuity of the Western Sahara
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conflict (Olsson 2006; Smith 2015; White 2015) and their intermittent impor-
tance in the construction of an independent Western Sahara (Kamal 2015).
The behaviour of states and international organisations like the United
Nations (UN), European Union (EU), and African Union (AU) has served as
the reference point for more extensive analyses (Benabdallah 2009; Dar-
bouche and Colombo 2010; Smith 2013). For example, the history of the
pillage and control of these natural resources – during both the Spanish
and Moroccan occupations – has been examined both historiographically
(Zoubir 2007; Drury 2012) and in the context of international law (Saul
2015). However, given the evolution of the international community, where
private actors (non-governmental organisations, or NGOs, companies, etc.)
have successfully undermined the hegemony of subjects of international
law (states and international organisations, or IOs), it is almost compulsory
to look at role they have played in the development of the Sahrawi conflict
(Campos 2008; Darbouche and Colombo 2010; Hagen 2015; Fišera 2017).
The economic interests that stalk the Sahrawi conflict are difficult to
ignore. Western Sahara is a land rich in a multitude of natural resources
that are of strategic and financial value for Morocco and also meet the
needs of other states. For this reason, a variety of foreign companies have
provided investments and technology in order to profit from these natural
resources that, according to international law, cannot be exploited without
the express consent of the Sahrawis, if it is detrimental to their interests or
entails infringements of fundamental right (Corell 2002; Case T-512/12).
The international legislation on natural resources in non-self-governing terri-
tories seems clear. However, both the Sahrawis – in statements issued by the
Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and Polisario Front (PF) – and
various NGOs report that this region is being stripped of resources like salt,
fish, and minerals without the consent of the legitimate inhabitants. The
occupying power has permitted this, because the export of resources
allows Morocco to solidify acceptance among the international community
that it is legitimately in possession of the territory. However, the non-Moroc-
can operating companies come from foreign states whose governments are
parties to resolutions like UNGA Resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1803 (XVII) and
have not tacitly recognised Western Sahara as part of Moroccan territory.
In light of the economic dimension of the conflict, this article analyses Nor-
wegian and Swedish pension funds and the investments they have made in
companies involved in the export of Sahrawi resources. Given the commit-
ment of these funds to act on corporate social and environmental issues,
combined with their efforts to change company attitudes and values by
applying their dominant position in the world’s financial markets (Sandberg
2013), an exploration of the outcomes of the work these funds have done to
influence corporate social and legal behaviours, as well as the efficiency of
shareholder pressure, is both timely and beneficial. Indeed, they have used
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financial tools to try to modify the behaviour of companies that import
natural resources from Western Sahara. Who are they? What instruments
do they use to achieve their interests? Have they been successful? These
are some of the questions that this article attempts to answer.
The article is structured as follows. Following this introduction, Section 2
summarises the legal status of Western Sahara and its natural resources;
Section 3 describes the empirical strategy used; Section 4 presents and dis-
cusses whether the Norwegian and Sweden pension fund ethical investment
strategy has had an impact on the companies who import natural resources
from Western Sahara without Sahrawi consent; and the paper ends with a
series of conclusions and recommendations.
Legal status: non-self-governing territories and natural
resources
Western Sahara is a disputed territory that measures 266,000 km2, with a popu-
lation of 582,000 inhabitants,1 and located on the northeast coast of Africa. It is
partially ‘occupied’ by Morocco and partially controlled by the Sahrawi Arab
Democratic Republic, or SADR.2 The largest territory with the greatest popu-
lation density of the 17 currently on the United Nations Special Committee on
Decolonisation list, it was occupied by Spain until the late twentieth century.
It was not until 1963 that the UN included Western Sahara on the list of non-
self-governing territories (United Nations 1963). Two years later, the United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed its first resolution regarding
Western Sahara, calling upon Spain to decolonise the territory. Despite the
fact that in the Report of the Committee on Information fromNon-Self-Govern-
ing Territories (United Nations 1963), the Spanish representative included a
warning about the difficulty of entering into consultations in Western Sahara
due to the size of the nomad population that characterised the Sahrawi way
of life (United Nations 1963, 8), Resolution 2229 (1966b) requested that Spain
hold a referendum on the right of the indigenous population to freely exercise
its right to self-determination.Morocco,Mauritania, andAlgeria, three key actors
in the future conflict, voted in favour of the resolution (United Nations 1980). In
1971, the Fourth Commission of theUNGAdecided topostpone thedecolonisa-
tion of Western Sahara. However, the 1972 Resolution 2983 reaffirmed ‘the
inalienable right of the people of the Sahara to self-determination and indepen-
dence’ despite the abstention of Morocco and other countries (UNGA 1972).
In July 1974, the Spanish government announced its intention to hold a
referendum on self-determination in early 1975. A dissenting Morocco,
backed by Algeria, prompted the UNGA to pass Resolution 3292 (XXIX) on
14 December 1975, which requested that the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) give an advisory opinion on some Moroccan and Mauritanian claims
regarding Western Sahara. It also asked that a special visiting mission be
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sent to evaluate the situation on the ground. Accordingly, Spain agreed to
postpone the consultation.
The United Nations visit to the territory confirmed the broad support of its
inhabitants for independence and the Polisario Front (PF),3 while the ruling
handed down by the ICJ recognised the right of the Sahrawis to self-determi-
nation and rejected any Moroccan claim to sovereignty over the territory.
However, it soon became clear that Morocco had no intension of abiding
by the ruling, but planned to take over the territory through the so-called
Green March of 1975. Despite its strong resolutions, the UN was unable to
prevent the Moroccan occupation and the forced evacuation of more than
half of the Sahrawi population, largely to Algeria.
In 1975, Spain tried to cede administrative control of the territory to a joint
Moroccan4 and Mauritanian administration in the Madrid Agreement.
However, in Resolution 3458 (A), whichwas issued shortly after the Agreement
was signed, the UNGA ignored its stipulations (Ruis-Miguel 2008), meaning
that the UN does not recognise the legality of the cession of Spain’s status
of ‘administrative power’ or its sovereignty. In the words of the report of 29
January 2002 written by the UN Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs,
Hans Corell, the Agreement ‘did not transfer sovereignty over the territory,
nor did it confer upon any of the signatories [Morocco and Mauritania] the
status of an administering Power, a status which Spain alone could not have
unilaterally transferred’ (Corell 2002). The AAN 256/2014, of July 7, 2014,
FJ40 states Spain remains as administering power. Additionally, the judgment
of the General Court in Case T-512/12, confirms that despite European Union
address the Moroccan authorities with regard the territory of Western Sahara,
that fact does not lead to any recognition de facto or de jure of any sovereignty
of the Kingdom of Morocco over the territory of Western Sahara.
However, after the war between Mauritania, Morocco, and the Polisario
Front5 and Mauritania’s subsequent withdrawal, Morocco secured de facto
control of most of the territory, including the primary cities and natural
resources. Hence, despite the fact that the UN that does not consider that
the term ‘occupied’ can apply to Western Sahara, for all practical purposes
and according to an analysis based on international law, everything indicates
that the territory is under Moroccan military occupation (Florén 2016). More-
over, according to Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to Pro-
tection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, this means that
[…] the Occupying Power shall be bound, for the duration of the occupation, to
the extent that such Power exercises the functions of government in such ter-
ritory, by the provisions of the following Articles of the present Convention: 1 to
12, 29 to 34, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 59, 61 to 77, 143. (ICRC 1949)
Here, the Moroccan policy to encourage the settlement of Moroccans on
Sahrawi territory is crucial, since Morocco’s strategy to control the territory
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is not only based on force. Rather, the cornerstone of the policy is the intro-
duction and promotion of colonisers who live off the resources while simul-
taneously delaying self-determination by sowing confusion about who has
the right to vote. This directly contravenes Article 49.6, which states that
‘the Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civil popu-
lation into the territory it occupies’ (ICRC 1949). Notably, most of the inhabi-
tants of the occupied territories are colonists who benefit from
commercialising Sahrawi merchandise, but whose consent to or benefit
from the exports has no effect on the requirements established by Hans
Corell (2002). Additionally, Paragraph 16.2 of the UN Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States dictates that no ‘State has the right to promote
or encourage investments that may constitute an obstacle to the liberation
of a territory occupied by force’. Even earlier, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the UNGA in 1996, stated in Article 1,
Paragraph 2 that
All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international econ-
omic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and inter-
national law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of
subsistence. (UNGA 1966a)
In the same vein, the UN in 1962 had passed Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14
December on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. This also
declared that
the exploration, development and disposition of such resources, as well as the
import of the foreign capital required for these purposes, should be in confor-
mity with the rules and conditions which the peoples and nations freely con-
sider to be necessary or desirable with regard to the authorization, restriction
or prohibition of such activities.
At the same time, it was understood that the insufficient enjoyment of
peoples to their right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources rep-
resented a serious impediment to the enjoyment of important human
rights (Haugen 2007).
After years of Morocco’s effective control over Western Sahara, in 2002 the
UNGA – in its ongoing effort to protect the inhabitants and natural resources
of non-self-governing territories from exploitation and plunder by foreign
economic interests – requested an opinion on the question from then UN
Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs Hans Corell regarding the ‘legality
[in] the signing of contracts with foreign companies for the exploration of
mineral resources in Western Sahara’. Although the request from the Security
Council was related to legal contracts for oil and natural gas exploration,
Corell determined that if they involved additional exploration and exploita-
tion activities ‘in disregard of the interests and wishes of the people of
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Western Sahara, they would be in violation of the international law principles
applicable to mineral resource activities in Non-Self-Governing Territories’
(Corell 2002). Thus, Corell’s conclusion differentiated between activities that
harmed and activities that benefited the indigenous inhabitants. Finally,
although Corel was not asked to take the territory’s fishery and phosphate
resources into consideration, he himself pointed to the possibility of
making an analysis by analogy (Corell 2010).
Considering not sovereignty has been recognised to Morocco over
Western Sahara, any treaty celebrate with Morocco should not be apply in
Western Sahara territory due to article 34 of the Vienna Convention. As
stated by European Union Court of Justice in case C-104/15 P, para 95, treaties
cannot impose any obligations or confer rights upon third states without
their consent. The population of Western Sahara, represented by Polisario
Front, are a third party within the meaning of the principle of relative
effect. Therefore, their consent is required to include Western Sahara in the
scope of any treaty.
Empirical strategy
Area of study
The national pension funds of two Nordic countries – Sweden and Norway –
were analysed in relation to their investments in companies that do business
in Western Sahara. As two of the largest sovereign wealth funds in the world
that also maintain a high ethical investment standard, these entities provide
an important opportunity to investigate the effect of ethical business on the
conflict over the natural resources that exist in the non-self-governing terri-
tory of Western Sahara. Indeed, the Norwegian pension fund is the largest
in the world, managing more than one trillion dollars in assets and account-
ing for 266.3 per cent of the country’s gross national product. The Swedish
fund also manages large reserves worth more than 200,000 million euros
(OECD 2019). Both funds have earned substantial profits from their annual
investments, especially since they implemented strict ethical codes. In real
terms, between 2013 and 2017, the Norwegian Government Pension Fund
Global (GPFG) obtained an annual rate of investment return of 6.7 per cent,
while Sweden’s return was between 8.2 per cent and 11 per cent, depending
on the fund being analysed6 (OECD 2019).
At this time, environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) frame-
works are becoming increasingly important components of institutional
investment programmes. These trends are affecting the investment land-
scape and infrastructure as investors demand greater transparency and
more information regarding the impact of their investments. Social impact
investments, broadly speaking, seek to have a beneficial social or
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environmental impact in areas ranging from human rights to health, safety,
education, and general wellbeing.
The conflict in Western Sahara, its location, and its natural resources have
revealed the limits of the justice intrinsic in international law and the UN’s
ability to take action. As discussed above, Western Sahara has been a non-
self-governing territory since 1963 and under Moroccan occupation since
1976. Despite the fact that no government recognises Moroccan sovereignty
over Western Sahara, business development around its natural resources can
be seen as a de facto recognition of that sovereignty. Therefore, natural
resources have a social importance in that they legitimise Morocco’s position,
both domestically and internationally (White 2015). As business ethics have
been said to begin where the law ends, questions that are beyond the
scope of the law, or where there is no definitive consensus regarding what
is good or bad, are of particular concern (Treviño and Nelson 2016, 34). In
this respect, the assessment of the behaviour of these two sovereign
wealth funds in zones of conflict or non-self-governing territories like
Western Sahara is highly revealing. It is not always easy to convince compa-
nies that they should abstain from investing in certain places or encourage
them to withdraw their activities. However, an appeal to human rights has
been found to be effective in many cases, due to the sensitivity to criticism
related to ethical standards that exists in companies and state governments,
particularly democratic ones.
Consequently, natural resources can be used to gain support for the
Sahrawi cause, if international companies can be convinced to cease oper-
ations in Western Sahara. In the words of Erik Hagen, director of the Norwe-
gian Support Committee for Western Sahara,
While Morocco is not going to stop extracting and trading Sahrawi resources,
because it is impervious to pressure and erroneously considers Sahara its
own, international companies are susceptible to modifying their behaviours
through international pressure and increased support for the Sahrawi cause.
(E. Hagen, telephone conversation, 25 May 2020)
Moreover, an analysis of the case elucidates a number of questions with
regard to (a) whether investors who enact ethical trading guidelines have
the clout to convince companies to modify their objectionable behaviour;
and (b) whether economic and soft-power mechanisms and institutions like
the pension funds analysed here can act as agents for change in the
conflict over natural resources in Western Sahara and emerge as significant
actors in the approach that the international community takes to this conflict.
Data and data handling
The analysis in this study drew on data from primary and secondary sources.
The secondary data were obtained from sustainability reports, annual reports,
THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES 7
corporate webpages, publicly available information, newspaper articles,
books, and journals. The primary data was acquired from direct contacts
with AP4 communication directors in Sweden, the head of communications
for the Norwegian ethics advisory board, and Spanish and Norwegian coordi-
nators from the NGO Western Sahara Resource Watch (WSRW). All these con-
tacts were asked about the pressure and divestment processes related to the
companies operating in Western Sahara and to identify these companies. A
semi-structured survey was also conducted by telephone with the coordina-
tor and member of the executive council of WSRW regarding the role played
by natural resources in the Western Sahara conflict, the activity of pension
funds with regard to exploiting natural resources, and the role of the NGO
itself. Additionally, the literature in the following areas was extensively
reviewed: the Western Sahara conflict, Western Saharan natural resources,
shareholder engagement, ethical business, socially responsible investments,
ESG, influence strategies, pension funds, and international law. An in-depth
review of the two pension funds was conducted by analysing publicly avail-
able information such as newspaper articles, annual and sustainability reports
from the year they began to 2020, and investment policies. In addition, infor-
mation on ethics councils was analysed (Figure 1).
The so-called triad-network model for social analysis was used, since the
pension funds are connected to different actors or interests that can easily
be divided into three sub-networks: economic, political, and societal. Accord-
ing to Mol (1995), the triad-network model constitutes a combination of a
specific analytical perspective, distinctive institutional arrangements, and a
restricted number of interacting actors, encompassing more than one analyti-
cal perspective. Specifically, the triad-network model rests on three network
perspectives (Mol 1995):
(1) Economic networks: these focus on interactions through economic rules
and resources between economic agents;
(2) Political networks: these focus on the interaction between institutions
that involve state organisations from a primarily political-administrative
perspective; and
(3) Societal networks: these aim to identify relations between economic
sectors and civil society organisations associated with the ‘life world’,
both directly and indirectly through state agencies.
These three sub-networks are particularly suitable to classify the actors and
interests connected to pension funds. Most significant is the main role of the
economic network, which is directly tied to the economic aspects of the
financial performance of the funds and includes the communication
between the investing company and the pension funds themselves (Wage-
mans, van Koppen, and Mol 2018). For this reason, a fund’s divestment
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policy and its effect on the behaviour of the companies included in the
pension fund study are examined. The political network is made up of the leg-
islative framework and policies that regulate the pension funds, specifically
the applicable international law and the behaviour of the states and
pension funds. The social network – NGOs and other societal actors – that
may influence the concerns that affect pension funds and, above all, their
ethics committees as they relate to social, environmental, and economic
aspects is considered as well.
The data were also analysed using the stakeholder saliencemodel (Mitchell,
Bradley, andWood1997),which explains the extent towhich the characteristics
of stakeholders influence decision-making in companies with respect to the
claims of other stakeholders (Majoch, Hoepner, and Hebb 2017) and has
been shown to be effective when analysing cases involving institutional inves-
tors (Ryan and Schneider 2003). This theory establishes that the perception of
company managers regarding the importance of what is proposed by other
interested parties is based on the degree to which they possess one, two, or
three of the following attributes: power, legitimacy, and urgency (Weitzner
and Deutsch 2015). The factors identified by Gifford (2010) are included: the
size of the stake and the shareholder, coalition building, the values of theman-
agers, and proximity. Although it is recognised that they have no direct
Figure 1. Analysis scheme.
THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES 9
relationship with other factors, these can affect the attributes of shareholder
salience both positively and negatively (Wagemans, van Koppen, and Mol
2018).
Ethical business in the fight against human rights violations
The exploitation and export of natural resources from Western Sahara by Mor-
occan and foreign companies is associated with a number of ethical, political,
and legal concerns. As noted, Western Sahara is a territory rich in natural
resources (fish, phosphate rock, and sand, among others), and in 2001
Morocco issued the first licenses to foreign companies to look for oil and
natural gas in the non-self-governing territory. The UN Security Council
responded by asking its legal office whether the measure was illegal, and
the UN legal counsel responded that, based on the rights of the peoples of
those territories to self-determination and the fact that the territory has not
completed the decolonialisation process, any further oil or natural gas explora-
tion or exploitation in Western Sahara would violate the law if the indigenous
Sahrawi people (a) did not consent; and (b) did not benefit from it (Corell 2002).
Despite the fact that the UN and the international community have declared
that international humanitarian law –which prohibits the commercial exploita-
tion of Sahrawi natural resources except for the immediate satisfaction of the
original population – does not apply to Western Sahara,7 the international
legislation that applies to the development and export of natural resources
from Western Sahara, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, is
sufficiently mature. The question, however, concerns the enforceability of
the regulation, particularly because companies are not full subjects of inter-
national law. Moreover, the standards and measures contained in international
law are conceived for state action and not for actors like the SADR, which is
recognised as the political representative of the Sahrawi people, but not as a
full subject of international law.8 Consequently, Corell’s opinion can serve as
the starting point for the concerns of investors when they negotiate with com-
panies that trade or exploit Sahrawi natural resources.
Through the SADR, the Polisario Front, and various NGOs, the Sahrawi
people have identified natural resources as a political threat with regard to
their eventual independence and for that reason, have made them the
focus of their efforts (Allan 2016; E. Hagen, telephone conversation, 25 May
2020). Supporters of the Sahrawis argue that, as the cost of the occupation
is covered by the sale of natural resources, they could serve as an incentive
to deactivate the conflict (E. Hagen, telephone conversation, 25 May 2020;
Allan 2016). In any case, if international law is not directly applicable or
enforceable with regard to international companies and the UN and inter-
national community are not inclined to act decisively, how can Corell’s
(2002) opinion be forcefully applied?
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Non-governmental organisations like WSRW choose to apply media and
societal pressure by gathering and publishing data to create active strat-
egies related to political persuasion, while other parties begin the corre-
sponding legal work (E. Hagen, telephone conversation, 25 May 2020).
They also recognise the key role of international actors like large investors,
who can apply pressure or withdraw financial support from the companies
operating in Western Sahara, impeding the plunder and sending a message
(E. Hagen, telephone conversation, 25 May 2020). However, if large inves-
tors are going to decide to put pressure on the companies in their portfo-
lios that do business in Western Sahara or even exclude them from their
investment universe, their decisions cannot be based exclusively on
market or economistic reasoning. Rather, their strategies must be motivated
by ethical concerns related to the exploitation and export of the natural
resources of non-self-governing territories. They must conduct their
business on the basis of ethical considerations and strong socially respon-
sible investment (SRI).
Ethical business and corporate social responsibility
Traditionally, the rationale guiding a company is to maximise benefits and
increase value. However, in recent decades, a new investment strategy has
gained importance that is known as ethical business or socially responsible
investment (SRI), part of the broader corporate social responsibility (CSR)
(Wagemans, van Koppen, and Mol 2013; Ivanova 2017). These strategies
have been expanding particularly rapidly in the financial sector.
Ethical business and social responsibility are used almost interchangeably in
everyday language. Asmany definitions have been given for the concept of CSR
(VanMarrewijk 2003) and ethical business canmean different things to different
people (Jones, Parker, and Ten Bos 2005), the two concepts require definition.
For the purposes of this article, ethical business is understood to be the inte-
gration of social values into day-to-day business activities, and is a reflection
of those values and behaviours when companies implement ethical principles
comprehensively; it does not drive them. Corporate social responsibility, in
turn, is often described as the totality of a corporation’s financial, social, and
environmental performance when it conducts its business. This article uses
the definition of CSR provided by Taylor (cited in Sarpong 2017):
CSR […] means respecting environmental values, contributing to economic
growth, promoting social progress and conducting business in a way that pre-
vents or mitigates negative impacts and enhances or sustains positive impacts
on local communities and host countries.
Therefore, SRI is an investment strategy designed to obtain financial returns
and approach nonfinancial risk through the integration of environmental,
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social, and governance factors (ESG) when making investment decisions
(Renneboog, Ter Horst, and Zhang, 2008). Investors apply a number of instru-
ments of influence from SRI (for example, regulation-based research, positive
or negative evaluations, stakeholder participation, impact investing), allowing
companies to voluntarily contribute to socially positive development through
actions related to the environment or to human rights (Crane and Matten
2007). In fact, stakeholder participation is commonly used as a strategy in
socially responsible investment to influence corporations in a desirable way
(Hamilton and Eriksson 2011; Ivanova 2017). A company’s commitment to
CSR, therefore, suggests that its strategy fulfils its social responsibilities as
expected by the stakeholders (Maignan and Ferrell 2004).
In many cases, SRI investors focus their efforts on influencing corporations
that have violated or run the risk of violating existing international standards,
principles, or regulations (Goodman et al. 2014), such as the permanent sover-
eignty of the peoples of non-self-governing territories over their natural
resources. Given the complex, multifaceted nature of SRI that emerges when
companies intersect with societies, an analysis of the subject cannot be
limited to the existence of ethical codes in a company. Rather, it is essential
to examine a company’s actions and to ensure that they are effectively
guided by the ethical codes they possess in writing (Murphy 1988).
In fact, pension funds have four primary instruments at their disposal with
which to influence companies: a commitment to dialogue, voting, legal pro-
cedures, and threats of divestment or exclusion. In other words, the funds can
engage in dialogue, using a regulation-based focus to identify the companies
they should invest in, vote or present resolutions at the annual shareholder
meetings of the participating corporations, or focus on exclusion, dissociating
themselves from a particular company. These instruments are interrelated
and not mutually exclusive.
However, opinions vary regarding the role that pension funds should have
in SRI. Critical voices claim that these funds should only concentrate on their
role as fiduciaries for their clients: retirees and contributors (Schäfer and von
Arx 2014). Others argue that pension funds are among the actors whose
ideology moves beyond conventional market logic and must apply principles
that transcend economics, while bearing in mind long-term profitability
(Goodman et al. 2014). Others go even further, contending that the global
holders of capital should transform pension funds into actors with a tremen-
dous capacity to produce positive externalities by influencing the companies
in their investment universe (Allen, Letourneau, and Hebb 2012).
The Norwegian and Swedish pension funds
Multinational companieson international stock exchangesare often ‘ownerless’,
in that they are ownedby everyone and there is not necessarily one singlemajor
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shareholder (Hagen 2015). This poses an additional challenge, since it is not
always easy to identify the responsible party when a company is behaving irre-
sponsibly and no one owner controls more than a small portion of the stocks. In
this respect, large institutional shareholders like pension funds are seen as
amongst the most powerful and influential actors in the financial market.
One of the reasons that pension funds are such salient stakeholders is their
size, since they invest an enormous amount of money in a wide range of
stocks and bonds on the stock exchange (Schäfer and von Arx 2014). The Nor-
wegian pension fund is worth 1.1 trillion dollars (8.6 trillion kroner), and
invests in more than 9,000 firms in 72 countries (CNBC 2017), while the
Sweden pension fund manages reserves valued at more than 200,000
million dollars (OECD 2019). Moreover, Norway and Sweden are two of the
four most active countries in Europe with regard to shareholder engagement
(Eurosif 2014), and their socially responsible investment practices are largely
driven bottom-up by the pension funds themselves and other institutional
investors (Eurosif 2016).
In both countries, the ministries of finance are responsible for administer-
ing the pension funds. However, Norway is unique in that it ceded oper-
ational management of its Government Pension Fund Global to Norges
Bank as a separate mandate. On the other hand, Sweden’s AP funds are a
Swedish government authority and its operations are primarily regulated
by the National Pension Insurance Funds (AP Funds9) Act, a law enacted by
the Swedish Parliament in 200010 that specifies the operation and mission
of each AP fund.
The pension funds in these two Nordic companies share a primary objec-
tive: to realise a greater financial return with regard to each country’s income
index (all of the capital in the Norwegian fund is invested abroad in foreign
currency). However, this goal must be balanced with the obligation to con-
sider ethical and environmental aspects in investment policies. Accordingly,
the funds have established an SRI policy that involves pressuring or excluding
companies that do not follow universally agreed-upon ethical and environ-
mental standards (Hoepner and Schopohl 2018). Based on this general objec-
tive, the Swedish funds have formulated some set core values which they
have summarised as acting in accordance with ‘the principles of engagement,
action, and change’, with the aim of making a difference. The definition of
what is considered ethical is made by the fund’s Council on Ethics by assim-
ilating the international conventions signed by Sweden. This ensures that
there is greater consensus about what actions are preferable and, thus,
that the impact is greater, since the other investors and companies share
the same definitions, producing ‘real power for change’ (K. Hammar, email
communication, 29 April 2020). In fact, since 2007, when the Council on
Ethics was founded, there has been close collaboration between AP1, AP2,
AP3, and AP4 aimed at aligning their positions. The ethical guidelines
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followed by Norway’s GPFG, in turn, have been in force since 2004 and are
part of a broad, transparent framework in which a range of tools are
applied to ensure responsible management of the fund. The threshold to
exclude companies is high, following the UN Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights (E. Erlandsen, email communication, 24 April 2020). The
GPFG differentiates between sectors where investment is prohibited and
those that require observation and exclusion if there is an unacceptable
risk that they may contribute to or be responsible for certain actions, includ-
ing serious or systematic human rights violations, serious violations of the
rights of individuals in situations of war or conflict, severe environmental
damage, or other particularly serious violations of fundamental ethical norms.
In the particular case of Western Sahara, the Swedish Council on Ethics has
taken a public position, focusing its analysis on companies that can be linked
to the extraction of mineral resources from Western Sahara in various ways.
The aim is to persuade these companies to address the problem and also
to adopt preventive policies, to cease extracting or purchasing mineral
resources from Western Sahara or, alternatively, to demonstrate that the
extraction or purchase of mineral resources is done in accordance with the
interests and wishes of the Saharawi people, in line with the 2002 UN
opinion on the situation in Western Sahara and procedures to prevent
future violations of these conventions (Council on Ethics, undated). The
GPFG, however, has not reserved a special place for Western Sahara on its
webpage. Nonetheless, the fund has taken an active position and issued
statements in the divestment reports it has produced over the years. The con-
cerns that the fund takes into account include a company’s knowledge about
and specification of the source of phosphates, the interchangeability of the
phosphate, and a company’s contractual ties with the Moroccan state-
owned Office Cherifien des Phosphates (OCP).
Pension funds in the social network analysis
In accordance with triad-network model for social analysis applied to the case
of Western Sahara here, three types of interdependent networks influence
the behaviour of pension funds: economic, political, and societal (Wagemans,
van Koppen, and Mol 2018). The economic network is home to the share-
holder engagement between pension funds and investees. Although the
funds in the two countries are transparent regarding active ownership and
are known to publish a list of the companies with which they have entered
into a formal dialogue, most of this process takes place behind closed
doors. Moreover, while pension funds do not have a single strategy based
on divestment or the exclusion of companies, their general strategy hinges
upon two lines of action. The first focuses on trying to convince the identified
companies to change their position on operating in Western Sahara, when
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this is seen as contravening international law or humanitarian norms. This line
is very important, and many companies do not, in fact, need to be excluded.
Rather, they change their position when contact is initiated and they are put
under pressure, as described by Hagen (2015). The second line does consist of
excluding companies from the investment portfolio. However, a combination
of the two lines is also used, and immediately excluding a company without
first trying to modify its position is uncommon. On the contrary, as the funds
and investors in general argue, excluding companies that do not meet ethical
standards eliminates the possibility of being able to directly and positively
influence them. At times, the real threat of divestment is sufficient and has
the added bonus of serving as a declaration of expectations or priorities on
the part of the funds.
Regarding the Swedish funds, since early 2009, the Sweden Council of
Ethics engagement consultant has conducted more than 600 face-to-face
meetings as part of the engagement programme, with the aim of driving
positive change based on constructive dialogue (Council of Ethics 2018).
Similarly, the fund portfolios confirm the divestment of holdings in the Cana-
dian fertiliser companies Agrium and PotashCorp and the Australian Incitec
Pivot in 2013 because their activities in Western Sahara did not adhere to
Corell’s opinion (2002). Agrium and PotashCorp merged to form Nutrien in
2018. However, as that company was also plundering Western Saharan
resources without the consent of the Sahrawis and there was, moreover, a
risk of human rights violations, Sweden divested from Nutrien as well (E.
Hagen, telephone conversation, 25 May 2020), although the country is
open to rethinking the relationship since receiving reports that this activity
ceased in December 2018.
Additionally, the AP funds are using ESG service providers like Sustainalytics
– a corporate engagement company serving the financial industry – to gain
supplementary information for their analyses and to develop and implement
an integrated investment strategy that takes ESG into consideration. In some
cases, the ESG providers also engage in dialogue with investees and they have
succeeded in bringing shareholders together through their services, providing
engagement opportunities in coalition with other shareholders.
In the case of Norway, the Government Pension Fund Global has played an
active role in influencing the companies that operate in Western Sahara since
the fund excluded San Leon Energy Plc, an Irish oil company that had
received two licences to operate in occupied Western Sahara, from its invest-
ment portfolios in 2003. Since then, it has divested from other companies,
including PotashCorp in 2011 and Agrium in 2014, because of their long-
term contracts with the Office Chérifien des Phosphates that were seen as
posing an unacceptable risk of contributing to violations of basic ethical
norms, contravening the guidelines of Norway’s largest pension company,
KLP, for responsible investment. The GPFG also heeded a recommendation
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from the Council of Ethics to sell its stakes in Cairn Energy and Kosmos
Energy, worth a combined 49.6 million euros, in late 2015. In 2019, on the
other hand, Nutrien, which had been importing almost half of the phosphates
from Western Sahara, was taken off the blacklist when it ceased to operate in
the territory in late 2018, a decision viewed as an engagement success. More-
over, the impact of this decision on the actors in the Sahrawi phosphate
market was twofold, since Nutrien is the largest shareholder in Sinofert, a
Chinese company that concentrated 5 per cent of phosphate imports in
2018 and is also expected to move away from the market.
However, the director of the GPFG noted in an email (E. Erlandsen, email
communication, Apr 24, 2020) that:
[…] in some cases, the Executive Board may deem active ownership a better
suited alternative for reducing the risk of continued norm violations. In addition
to exclusions based on the ethical guidelines, the Fund may make financial risk-
based divestments based [on] environmental, social and governance issues,
within the risk limits.
This is what appears to have happened in the case of the recommendation
made by the Council of Ethics in 2015 regarding the American company Inno-
phos (WSRW 2015), when the Council decided that the company’s activity
was contributing to maintaining the area’s unresolved international legal
status. Although the Council considered it grossly unethical for the
company to purchase long-term contract phosphate minerals extracted in
Western Sahara by the OCP, Norges Bank decided to continue to invest.
Despite this decision, however, as Table 1 shows, the company ceased to
import phosphates from Western Sahara.
The second segment of the triad-networkmodel concerns political networks.
It is not possible to separate thebehaviour of investment funds fromthebroader
context that includes the official positions of national governments on the
conflict or the development of international standards regarding the natural
resources in non-self-governing territories. The organic structure of the funds
also has an impact on their management strategies. The way in which they
are involved in state organisations and their degree of independence have
had different effects in the case of engagement strategies in Western Sahara.
There is a close relationship between fund management and the political
apparatus. The funds are free to act, but within certain limits imposed by the
government, which decides the ethical guidelines to be included. The funds
use active ownership as a tool to influence a company’s decision-making pro-
cesses. For instance, ministries of finance have used funds as leverage over
companies that contravene their values or councils of ethics. In the case of
Norway, these actions have had an influence on the country’s foreign policy;
the Norwegian government has urged businesses to stay away from the terri-
tory, as the annexation of Western Sahara is not recognised (WSRW 2011a).11
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However, changes in thisnetwork can influence theway inwhich fundsoperate
in Western Sahara. For example, since 18 December 2014, GPFG exclusions have
been regulated by guidelines established for the observation and exclusion of
companies adopted by the Norwegian Ministry of Finance. The question of who
decides to exclude a company from the fund’s investment universe or place a
businesson thewatchlist, however, has changed. Prior to1 January2015, decisions
weremade by theMinistry of Finance, but as of that date, Norges Bank’s Executive
Board has assumed responsibility, coinciding with the decision not to implement
the recommendation todisinvest from Innophos (despite the fact that the govern-
ment also asserted that the opening to invest in the ‘illegitimately annexed’ terri-
torywas given under the condition that it benefitted the local population, in other
words ‘the Sahrawi people’) (WSRW 2011a).
Politics has also materialised in Norway’s determination that not all com-
panies that buy phosphates from Western Sahara should necessarily be
accused of unethical behaviour. In its decisions to adopt recommendations
from the Council of Ethics, the Ministry of Finance usually attached particular
Table 1. Imports per company as a percentage of total exports (2012–18).
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
PotashCorp (Nutrien since 2018) 16.8 32.5 9 33.5 15.4 24 46
Agrium (Nutrien since 2018) 7.8 37.8 31.2 31.2 33.3
Innophos 15.7 12.3 7.7
Ravensdown (New Zealand) 10.4 8.2 4.9 7.1 10.1 6.9 11
Lifosa 9.8 18.3 19.4 4.8 3.7
Ballance (New Zealand) 8.9 6.4 7.6 7.3 8.7 14 12
Unknown (India) 8.8 2.3 2.6
Tripoliven 7.1 1.8 1.6
Menomerus 4.7 4.9 4.8 2.9 3.1 1.1
Incitec Pivot 3.4 3.2 4.6 4.5 5.7
Unknown (South Korea) 3.9
Unknown (Argentina) 3.1




Unknown (Point Comfort USA) 1.1
Unknown (AB Lifosa?) 3.2
Unknown (Venezuela) 3.7 3.7




Divested by Swedish pension fund
Divested by Norwegian pension fund
Recommendation to divest
Divested by both funds
Pension fund investee
Source: Data from P for Plunder 2019, WSRW.
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importance to whether the companies knew the source of the phosphates
and had specified that they wanted phosphates from Western Saharan
mines, and whether the purchase was a one-off (WSRW 2011b).
As state agencies, the Swedish AP funds also depend to a large extent on
the legislative framework that monitors them. In the political network, they
are constrained by the Swedish government through the AP Funds Act
(Sveriges riksdag 2000), which establishes a difference between the various
funds. For instance, AP7 is not allowed to vote in corporations listed on the
Swedish stock market (AP7 2019), while AP1 and AP4 can participate and
vote in nomination committees in that market (AP1 2018; AP4 2019). The pol-
itical network, consequently, limits AP7’s instruments of influence.
The third and final factor is the social network, which has become
increasingly important in the relationship between Western Sahara and
pension funds. Most of the actors who use shareholder engagement and
cooperation platforms and coalitions with stockholders logically concen-
trate on the economic network. However, interviews have shown that
NGOs can play a particularly important role in the working of the funds.
This involves informal coalition building, in which investors are grouped
together or work with NGOs, policymakers, or other stakeholders to
strengthen their all-around salience (Wagemans, van Koppen, and Mol
2018). The coalitions support each other to identify issues for action, disse-
minate information related to these issues, and propose action strategies.
The AP funds recognise the need for companies like Sustainalytics to
improve the quality of the information required to implement fund strat-
egies based on ethical criteria. This same role is played by NGOs like
Western Sahara Research Watch, which defines itself as a ‘databank for
the Sahrawi people and other structures similar to our NGO that can use
these data to inform more active strategies’.
At this time, there are dozens of companies operating in Western Sahara.
The complexity of the issue highlights the importance of managing efforts
and establishing limits. As they monitor the situation, NGOs provide infor-
mation that can help funds differentiate between what actions are serious,
very serious, or go too far. In fact, some funds have, for example, distin-
guished between companies that have oil and gas exploration licenses and
those that have actually begun to drill, in order to begin conversations or
to exclude them from the investment universe.
Conclusion and recommendations
This article has examined the corporate social outcomes of dialogue with
shareholders regarding pension fund participation as a socially responsible
investment strategy in Western Sahara, finding several individual examples
of significant results in the corporate social performance of these entities.
18 S. LÓPEZ-RUIZ AND M. L. GRANDE-GASCÓN
Recent decades have witnessed an increase in the importance of pension
funds and other institutional investors in stock markets around the world.
At the same time that their clout, size, and legitimacy have increased in
this sector, the funds have incorporated a set of values and tried to
influence the ethical performance of their investees using socially responsible
investment strategies.
The two funds studied in this article are looking for higher financial returns.
However, the operations must also take into account a body of values that, in
the Swedish case, align with the conventions signed by the country, and in
Norway, conform to guidelines that have been in force since 2004 designed
to watch and/or exclude companies. The optimal management of the retire-
ment capital of the respective populations is intrinsically tied to the funds
playing an active role in the companies in which they participate, and to
the involvement of environmental, social, and corporate governance factors.
When the funds influence the companies operating in Western Sahara, it
suggests that the more tools of influence they have, the more effective
their strategy will be. This seems to indicate that investors who implement
ethical trade guidelines are a key driving force behind urging companies to
modify their objectionable behaviours. The analysis also shows that the
primary mechanisms to influence companies are economic, particularly the
threat of the divestment (which does not always have to be carried out).
By using these instruments and stakeholder engagement, funds can serve
as an agent for change in the conflict. Although some companies continue
to export natural resources from Western Sahara, all of the enterprises that
have been watched or expelled from the the investment universe have
ceased their export activity (see Table 1, phosphates, 2012–18). Nonetheless,
except in the case of Innophos and Nutrien, the decision to leave the Sahrawi
market did not occur immediately after divestment.
The export of natural resources has been used by Morocco as a strategy to
legitimise the country’s occupation. Nutrien’s decision to stop exporting
phosphates – almost 50 per cent of the total – demonstrates both the
success of pension funds and a growing awareness within companies. At
this time, Morocco is increasingly dependent on just a few companies. If Sino-
fert leaves the market – due to the fact that its main investor is Nutrien – the
export of Sahrawi phosphates will be concentrated in four companies
(Balance,12 Ravensdown,13 Coromandel and Paradeep) from two countries
(New Zealand and India).
At the same time, the role of coalition building in successful strategies is
notable. In this case, the funds that have made use of ESG service providers
found that this improved their dialogue with shareholders regarding partici-
pation. Another important informal coalition brought the funds together with
Western Sahara Research Watch, since this group engages in large-scale
monitoring that the funds use to identify possible actions that may require
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investee observation. According to whether the funds are able, or wants to
strengthen cooperation with other interested parties in the conflict, like
NGOs, and align with political initiatives, it is reasonable to assume that
they will be able to raise their legitimacy and immediacy in the eyes of
their investees, consequently increasing the effectiveness of the shared com-
mitment to socially significant results. This is particularly important since the
funds do not participate in all of the companies involved, making it necessary
for this type of strategy to be shared with other investors.14
The commitment of funds to socially responsible investment has been
effective, as shown by the enterprises that have ceased to export phosphates
and other natural resources. However, an increasing number of companies are
currently investing in renewableenergy inWesternSahara.Due to the funds’ com-
mitment to environmental, social, and corporate governance factors, this may be
one way of eluding some of the ethical guidelines. Future researchmust be done
into how the funds manage this type of investment in an occupied territory.
Notes
1. UNdata, the database of the United Nations Statistics Division (Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations). Available on: http://data.un.org/
en/iso/eh.html
2. Responsible for resource development in the liberated area of the territory. The
SADR has taken a leading role in asserting territorial sovereignty and preserving
natural resources pending the restoration of complete independence through
the UN-mandated self-determination process.
3. The illegitimate Sahrawi interlocutor to the UN. It represents the concerns of the
people regarding the looting and plunder of natural resources.
4. Morocco formally claimed the territory in 1957.
5. The UN considers the Polisario Front the legitimate representative of the
Sahrawi people.
6. Sweden’s sovereign wealth fund has a differentiated structure, with four funds
(AP1 through AP4) in addition to AP6, each with a different investment strategy.
7. This would involve recognition of the occupation of the territory in the terms
defined by the Hague and Geneva conventions.
8. The Sahrawi state would have to be recognised and have all the prerogatives of
a subject of international law.
9. The APs are organised into five buffer funds (AP1, AP2, AP3, AP4 and AP6) and
one premium pension fund (AP7). The pension system is divided into several
funds to spread the financial risk in asset management. There are several differ-
ences between the funds in terms of how the investments are divided amongst
different types of assets, since the governing board of each fund makes its own
allocation decisions within the framework of the National Pension Insurance
Funds Act (AP1 2019).
10. In January 2019, the AP Funds Act was amended to include sustainable devel-
opment as a new goal.
11. Despite the fact that Norwegian firms have said that the signals they have
received from the Ministry in terms of what they can do in the territory have
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been unclear, since 2011 the direction seems straightforward. At this time, there
are no Norwegian companies involved in Western Sahara exports.
12. For Balance’s position on Western Sahara: https://ballance.co.nz/Ethical-Sourcing
13. For Ravensdowns’s position on Western Sahara: https://www.ravensdown.co.
nz/services/product-availability/phosphate-rock-supply
14. Hagen (2015) analyses and describes the actions of other investors who have
also engaged in similar strategies with differing degrees of success.
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